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Sovereign
DESIRES
Self-determination has been at the heart of Aboriginal 
aspirations. As a slogan, it echoes through the twentieth 
century. But Garth Nettheim argues that sovereignty is 
rarely defined, and often misunderstood.
he term 'sovereignty' has several tech­
nical legal meanings as well as a less 
specific general or political meaning. 
When aboriginal people in Australia, 
or elsewhere, assert their sovereignty they may 
be using the phrase in either a legal or a political 
sense or in a sense that represents some amalgam 
of the two. Communication becomes difficult if 
those attempting dialogue use words in different 
senses. The same sort of problems beset refer­
ences to 'treaties' and discussions about the claim 
of indigenous peoples to 'self-determination'. 
These problems arise in debates about law and 
policy, at the national and the international 
levels.
Peoples have been encroaching on other peoples' ter­
ritories for millenia but it is perhaps sufficient to go back 
only 500 years to the rise of the modem state, the begin­
nings of European colonial expansion—1992 marks the 
500th anniversary of Columbus' 'discovery' of 'The New 
World'—and the birth of modem international law.
Themes emerged five centuries ago about the relationships 
between colonisers and indigenous peoples that continue
to resound today. Satisfactory resolution seems as elusive 
today as then.
The fundamental question is, inevitably, by what right a 
people from one land take over territories occupied by 
other peoples. In modem international law such conduct 
is clearly unlawful in terms of the United Nations Charter, 
Article 2(4), which states:
All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations.
While this prohibition has been honoured more in the 
breach than in the observance, it is the basis for the UN 
Security Council's response to Iraq's takeover of Kuwait. 
However, in earlier centuries colonial expansion was a 
matter of "might is right", and any international disputa­
tion tended to revolve only around the question of which 
European power had the superior right to colonise a par­
ticular territory and its people. Nonetheless, questions of 
moral and legal entitlement were always present, even 
within the colonial power.
In a period of colonial expansion there is no shortage of 
people ready to find justifications. The sheer self-interest 
in the acquisition of territory and resources may be dressed
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up in references to the Christian mission of conversion. 
This will often be linked with a denigration of the existing 
inhabitants. Such a denigration of the colonised peoples 
may refer to their 'primitive' forms of land use compared 
to such 'advanced' practices as cultivation or forest 
clearance or mining. It may refer to 'barbaric' or simply 
non-Christian beliefs or practices. It is not only Christians 
who may denigrate those of other faiths and lifestyles, as 
can be seen in more recent non-European examples of 
imperial expansion in places such as Tibet, West Papua and 
East Timor.
The classic debate along these lines took place in 1550-1551. 
The Valladolid disputation was convened by King Charles 
V of Spain and the Council of the Indies in an attempt to 
resolve the continuing contention within Spain over the 
morality and legality of the wars of conquest against the 
Indians. The case for the colonialists was presented by Juan 
Gines de Sepulveda. The case for the Indianists was 
presented by Bartolome de las Casas. Las Casas refuted 
Sepulveda’s several justifications for conquest and insisted 
that the political and legal sovereignty and jurisdiction of 
the Indian nations had to be respected. He was not, of 
course, successful in averting the impact of Spanish 
colonialism, but his writings (and those of his contem­
porary, Francisco de Vitoria) represent a strand in thinking
in international law from that early period which is of 
continuing relevance in debates about sovereignty, self- 
determination and indigenous rights today. In particular, 
the colonialist device of denigrating the colonised was 
strongly repudiated.
Denigration may go even further. It may extend to denying 
the inhabitants the status of occupiers of the land. Hence 
the statements, common in European juristic writings of 
the 17th and 18th centuries, that peoples such as hunter- 
gfitherers who neither till the soil nor live in settled villages, 
do not 'occupy' or 'possess' the land at all, but simply 
wander across it. However, the practice of European States, 
including Britain, during this period was to acknowledge 
the political status of indigenous peoples and to negotiate 
treaties to regulate their relationships with them.
Cook's instructions from the Admiralty were that he 
should obtain "the consent of the natives', if there be any, 
to establish "convenient stations". But discussions about 
Australia in the period between Cook's first voyage and 
the departure of the First Fleet proceeded to a large extent 
on the belief that Australia was literally uninhabited. Sir 
Joseph Banks' testimony to the House of Commons' Select 
Committee on Transportation surmised that there were 
thin populations on the eastern coastline but that the inte­
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nor was quite empty. On the basis of this misinformation, 
and also on the basis of notions of cultural superiority, the 
English treated the land as terra nullius—land belonging 
to no one—and regarded themselves as entitled to take 
over the territory and to settle the land without regard to 
any rights of the prior inhabitants. The contrast with con­
temporaneous British policy in North America, New 
Zealand and elsewhere was quite marked.
Soon after settlement in Australia, it- became quite clear 
that all parts of the country were in fact populated, and 
that particular peoples had very strong attachments to 
particular territories—sufficiently strong to induce them 
to engage in prolonged guerrilla warfare in their defence. 
By the 1830s the British Colonial Office deemed it ap­
propriate to recognise prior Aboriginal rights, specifically 
in regard to the settlement of South Australia, but it proved 
too late in the day to alter the assumptions and practices 
of the colonies themselves.
By the middle and later 19th century, European justifica­
tions for colonialism and the denigration of indigenous 
peoples were reaching their most extreme form. Even in 
the lands where treaties had been negotiated, the fortunes 
of the indigenous people were little better than in 
Australia. In the United States, Canada and New Zealand 
indigenous peoples argue that their pre-existing rights and 
their treaty rights have been ignored or eroded by the 
settler societies, and they continue to press claims in terms 
of sovereignty, self-determination and self-government.
Increasingly, governments in these several countries are 
beginning to acknowledge the proposition advanced four 
and a half centuries ago by Las Casas, that the relationship 
between colonising peoples and indigenous peoples has to 
be perceived in political-legal terms. There are, in addition, 
moves (also echoing Las Casas but currently resisted by 
national governments) towards treating the relationship as 
one to be defined by international law.
By the early part of the 20th century a Eurocentric concep­
tion had evolved which perceived international law as 
concerned almost exclusively with the mutual rights and 
obligations of States and their governments. The States 
themselves seldom coincided with peoples or nations but 
frequently divided them, or grouped various nations and 
peoples within their borders. How the governments of 
those States dealt with their own subject peoples was 
regarded, with few exceptions, as of no concern to interna­
tional law.
Since the end of World War Two the scope of international 
law has dramatically broadened to incorporate a concept 
of human rights. The Charter of the United Nations, in 
Article 1, defines the purposes of the organisation as in­
cluding not only the maintenance of international peace 
and security but also respect for equal rights and self-deter­
mination of peoples as conducive to friendly relations 
among nations and "promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion...". 
The subsequent development of international law on 
human rights has been through such instruments as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a series of 
treaties, conventions and covenants ratified by the govern­
ments of many states.
These new international standards, together with the (still 
rudimentary) implementation procedures, have been of 
value in addressing some of the claims of indigenous 
peoples, but not all of them. In particular, international 
human rights law has proved inadequate to meet 'group' 
or 'collective' claims advanced by indigenous peoples in 
respect of culture, territory and autonomy, particularly the 
autonomy claims. The term 'autonomy' here refers to any 
sort of status under which a people have effective political 
control over the matters that concern them. The word 
'sovereignty' is sometimes used in this popular sense.
Whatever popular meaning that the term 'sovereignty' 
may have had or may still have, it now has a quite technical 
meaning in international law as denoting
...the basic international legal status of a State that 
is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to 
the governmental, executive, legislative, or judi­
cial jurisdiction of a foreign State or to foreign law 
other than public international law.1
Within contemporary international relations the govern­
ment of the Commonwealth of Australia is regarded as 
having sovereignty, in relation to other sovereign States. 
Can a rival or competing sovereignty in this specific legal 
sense be claimed on behalf of Australia's indigenous 
peoples? Such a claim was argued in Coe v Commonwealth 
(1979) but the High Court held that such a proposition was 
not arguable. Justice Jacobs pointed out that such issues
...are not matters of municipal [ie, national] law 
but of the law of nations [ie, international law] and 
are not cognisable in a court exercising jurisdic­
tion under that sovereignty which is sought to be 
challenged.
Can such a claim be argued in the International Court of 
Justice? The problem here is that to be entitled to argue a 
case in that court you have, generally speaking, to be a 
State. Hence, a classic "Catch 22": the only forum that may 
adjudicate whether you are a sovereign State requires, 
before it even listens to you, that you be a sovereign State! 
There are slightly better prospects to argue a non-rival 
sovereignty or sovereignties within the overall 
sovereignty of the Commonwealth of Australia. Indeed, 
the notion is already familiar within our federal system in 
which the six states claim to be sovereign entities, subject 
to the Commonwealth Constitution.
United States law has long acknowledged a subordinate 
sovereignty in individual Indian nations in terms first 
articulated in the 1820s and 1830s by Chief Justice Mar­
shall. They are subject to the authority of the United States 
government but they have a right of internal self-govem- 
ment and a degree of sovereign immunity, especially with 
regard to matters arising on Indian lands.
In New Zealand, Maori argue that the proper interpreta­
tion of the 2nd Article of the Treaty of Waitangi, 1840,
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preserves internal sovereignty or self-government to the 
Maori. In Australia a similar proposition has most fre­
quently taken the form of claims for a degree of immunity 
from the jurisdiction of settler courts. Such claims have 
been asserted since the early years of European settlement. 
While some courts were ready to accept such arguments 
(eg Willis J in Bonjon) the view that has generally prevailed 
has been that of the Full Supreme Court of New South 
Wales in R v Murrell (1836), followed in R v Wedge (1976), 
that Aboriginal people were fully subject to the introduced 
legal system. But the issue continues to be raised.
The word 'treaty' is another term that once had a quite 
general meaning which included any sort of agreement. In 
modem times, however, these other usages have come to 
be regarded as obsolete and the term is confined to formal 
agreement between two or more independent States. It 
could be argued that the act of a colonising government in 
concluding a treaty with an indigenous nation represents 
an acknowledgment of the independent status of such 
indigenous nation, of its legal capacity to enter into such 
an agreement and, hence, of its sovereignty. Many of the 
earlier North American treaties, for example, took the form 
of treaties for peace and friendship, for alliance, or for 
trade, and dearly acknowledged not only the capacity of 
the indigenous nation to enter the treaty but also the con­
tinuation thereafter of that independent nation status.
However, the treaties characteristic of the 19th and 20th 
centuries made provision for non-indigenous land settle­
ment and for governmental rights of the colonising power. 
If the act of entering such a treaty was an exercise of 
sovereign power, was the effect of the treaty to relinquish 
sovereignty? The critical fact is that such treaties nave 
fallen to be interpreted by the courts of the settler society, 
and the clear trend has been to deny such treaties any 
international status whatsoever, ie. one party to the agree­
ment has used its institutions to restrict the original mean­
ing, as understood by the indigenous nation. This hasbeen 
the pattern in the United States, in Canada, and in New 
Zealand. In Australia, where treaties have been con­
spicuously absent, modern proposals to negotiate some 
sort of instrument of reconciliation have tended to avoid 
any use of the word 'treaty' (though Prime Minister Hawke 
has not hesitated, on occasion, to use the term).
Self-determination is a relatively modem concept in inter­
national law, though only in the sense that it connotes the 
right to recover political autonomy; conceptually, it is clear­
ly linked with much older principles that peoples ought 
not to be deprived of such autonomy.
The right of self-determination finds expression in the 
Charter of the United Nations and in the two International 
Covenants that developed the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights into treaty form: the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Both 
Covenants have an identical Article 1 which commences:
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All peoples have the right to self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development....
This was the primary basis, especially after 1960, for the 
massive process of decolonisation, presided over by the 
UN's Decolonisation Committee, whereby former 
European colonies in Asia, Africa and elsewhere progres­
sively achieved independence as sovereign States. But one 
major category of colonised people who have not enjoyed 
the benefits of decolonisation are those indigenous peoples 
subordinated within the borders of independent States. 
United Nations practice has been to confine the right to 
self-determination to people in the 'classic7 colonial context 
of governance from a distant European power. Anything 
beyond that is perceived as a potential threat to the ter­
ritorial integrity of established States.
That threat has been overstated because, in the heyday of 
Third World decolonisation, 'self-determination' came to 
be regarded as virtually synonymous with 'inde­
pendence'. But 'self-determination' is a process; it does not 
necessarily indicate one particular outcome of that process, 
independence. It contemplates the right of a "people" to 
make a free choice about their political-legal relationship 
with a State. A variety of relationships may be possible 
which meet the legitimate needs of the indigenous people 
ranging from full integration, at one end of the spectrum, 
to full independence, at the other. The latter may be politi­
cally unachievable in many cases, and certainly faces major 
political difficulties in Australia. But a variety of other 
forms of autonomy may be achievable within the overall 
sovereignty of the State. It is quite likely that the future will 
see some creative development of the concept of self-deter­
mination in a way that may serve to meet the aspirations 
of many indigenous peoples.
In many States where indigenous peoples have been 
colonised, the settler society has attempted to deal with 
them in a variety of ways. Extermination has been tried, 
and the more modem techniques of destruction of habitat 
or relocation have similar consequences. Assimilation has 
often been pursued, generally without success. Govern­
ments have frequentlysjreated the problems of mar­
ginalised indigenous peoples as problems of welfare, to be 
dealt with by funds and programs and bureaucrats—also 
usually without success. The application of human rights 
standards, nationally and internationally, has produced 
some benefits, but problems persist in the relationship 
between the indigenous people and the settler society. 
National governments are beginning to acknowledge that 
the issues have to be addressed in fundamental terms that 
go to the legal and political basis of that relationship.
This became evident in Canada in the 1982 "con- 
stitutionalisation" of aboriginal and treaty rights and in the 
subsequent attempt, through a series of First Ministers' 
Conferences, to define an aboriginal right of self-govern­
ment. It emerged in New Zealand with the statutory un­
derpinning, since 1975, of the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal as a forum for 
hearing Maori claims. It has even been evident in Australia 
in discussion about a treaty or makarrata or instrument of
reconciliation and in some of the rhetoric about the new 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC). All these governments, however, continue to 
view the relationship as one which is to be defined as a 
matter of national law so as to leave the peoples ultimately 
at the mercy of national governments.
Indigenous peoples are arguing strongly that their 
relationship to the enveloping State should be treated as a 
matter of international law. The principal forum in which 
such claims are being developed is the United Nations 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations which, since 
its establishment in 1982, has opened its deliberations to 
indigenous peoples from around the world. The working 
group is in the process of drafting a Universal Declaration 
on Indigenous Rights. The current draft contains a number 
of strong statements about the right of indigenous peoples 
to self-determination even if within the context of a non- 
indigenous State. Indigenous claims of this nature are 
unlikely to be completely palatable to States, but it is quite 
feasible that international law may well develop to the 
point where there are reasonably firm standards to meet 
indigenous aspirations, together with some form of inter; 
national monitoring of State conduct.
For some indigenous peoples such developments will be 
insufficient. They will continue to seek full decolonisation 
and recognition of their independent nationhood. The 
people of East Timor, for example, have shown their per­
sistence in resisting the recent substitution of a new In­
donesian colonisation for an ancient and retreating 
Portuguese colo'nialism. The Six Nation Iroquois Con­
federacy in North America has continually asserted its 
international sovereign status.
For Australia's indigenous peoples, the Torres Strait Is­
landers may have a stronger chance of achieving inde­
pendence through existing decolonisation arrangements 
(which are, arguably, too restrictive), being geographically 
separate from Australia and having been subject to rela­
tively minor non-Islander settlement. For mainland 
Aboriginal peoples, however, achievement of a complete, 
independent sovereignty faces considerable political and 
procedural problems. But some measure of sovereignty in 
a popular sense, some degree of self-determination and 
self-government, is not only feasible, it is essential for the 
recovery of Aboriginal communities from the impact of 
two centuries of continuing colonisation.
It will take a major act of creative statesmanship for 
Australian governments to sit down with representatives 
of the indigenous peoples in an attempt to negotiate a 
redefinition of the political and legal basis of the relation­
ship. But without such an attempt the relationship will 
continue to cause grave difficulties for the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples and, indeed, to Australian 
society as a whole.
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